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330 IN RE HENRY [65 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 10029. In Bank. Nov. 22, 1966.] 
In re GEORGE WILLIAM HENRY on Habeas Corpu& 
[1] Criminal ,Law-Double Punishment.-Imposition of concurrent 
sentences for attempted robbery of, and assault with a deadly 
weapon on, a bar owner constituted double punishment (Pen. 
Code, § 654) where both offenses were incident to the one ob-
jective of robbery; and the sentences could not be upheld on 
the theory that the evidence also showed an attempted robbery 
of the owner's clerk, a second victim, -and that the failure of 
the information to name the clerk as the victim of the at-
tempted robbery could be regarded· as an immaterial variance, 
where the judge was of the opinion, and the prosecutor agreed, 
that the sentences should be concurrent because there was but 
one attempted robbery of the owner with the assault on him 
forming an indivisible part of the transaction. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Sentence for assault with deadly weapon set aside,. 
order to show cause discharged and writ denied. 
George William Henry, in pro. per., and Allan B. 0 'Connor, 
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Daniel J. Kremer, Deputy At-
torney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-An information charged petitioner and 
three codefendants, Jenkins, Whitfield, and Hill, with 
attempted armed robbery of Chester Gambucci and with 
assault upon him with a deadly weapon. A jury found peti-
tioner guilty as charged. The trial court imposed concurrent 
sentences for the two offenses. l 
[1] Petitioner contends that the concurrent sentences inflict 
multiple punishment in violation· of Penal Code section 654,2 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 275. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Criminal Law, § 1475. 
tWe are not here concerned with a third sentence, also concurrent, for 
petitioner's possession of a concealable weapon after he had been previ· 
ously convicted of felony. Petitioner has served the maximum term of 
five years for that offense. (Former Pen. Code, 112021 [S18ts. 1953, 
ch.36].) 
2Penal Code section 654: "An act or omission which is made punish. 
able in different ways by different provisions of this code may be pun· 
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and invokes the rule of Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 
Ca1.2d 11, 19 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839], that "If all of 
the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may 
be punished for anyone of such offenses but not for more than 
one. " 
Gambucci owned a liquor store and adjoining bar, and 
Charles Moe was his clerk. On January 13, 1958, petitioner, 
Whitfield, and Hill entered the store. Whitfield and Hill drew 
pistols, and petitioner stood watching the entrance. Hill 
pointed his gun at Moe and ordered him to put money from 
the cash register into a paper bag. As Moe was doing so Whit-
field hit Gambucci with the butt of his pistol and then shot 
him. Meanwhile, petitioner went into the bar and at gunpoint 
took the telephone receiver from a customer who was making a 
call. Petitioner, Whitfield, and Hill then fled from the store, 
leaving the money scattered on the floor. They rode away in an 
automobile driven by defendant Jenkins. Shortly thereafter 
police stopped the automobile and took the four defendants 
into custody. 
The Attorney General concedes that the undisputed evi-
dence establishes that the assault and the attempt to rob Gam-
bucci were incident to the one objective of robbery and that 
the sentence for the assault, the offense subject to the lesser 
punishment,S should be set aside. The two sentences cannot 
stand because of possible prejudice to petitioner when he 
comes before the Adult Authority for the fixing of his term. 
(People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 748, 763 [26 Cal.Rptr. 
473, 376 P.2d 449] ; In re Cruz (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 178, 181 [49 
Cal.Rptr. 289,410 P.2d 825] ; In re Romano (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 
826,829 [51 Cal.Rptr. 910, 415 P.2d 798].) 
[1] Despite the Attorney General's concession as to double 
punishment, the question has arisen whether both sentences 
should be upheld on the grounds that the evidence established 
an assault upon and attempted robbery of Gambucci and an 
attempted robbery of Moe, that section 654 does not apply 
when one lawless course of conduct harms more than one 
victim (Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Ca1.2d 11, 20; 
People v. Ridley (1965) 63 Ca1.2d 671, 678 [47 Cal.Rptr. 796, 
408 P.2d 124]), and that the naming of Gambucci rather than 
ished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished 
under more than one ..•• " 
8Assault with a deadly weapon is punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than 10 years. (Pen. Code, § 245.) Attempted armed robbery is 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. (Pen. Code, 
II 211a, 213, 664, subd. 1.) 
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Moe as the victim in the charge of attempted robbery should 
be regarded as an immaterial variance under Penal Code 
section 956.4 
Discussion between the trial judge and counsel before the 
imposition of the concurrent sentences, however, establishes 
that the prosecuting attorney did not contend and the judge 
did not determine that mUltiple sentences should be imposed 
because of the proof that both Moe and Gambucci were victims 
of defendants' course of criminal conduct. That discussion 
shows that the judge was of the opinion, and the prosecuting 
attorney agreed, that the sentences should be concurrent 
because there was one attempted robbery with the assault on 
Gambucci forming an indivisible part of the transaction. I In 
view of this manifest intent of the prosecuting attorney who 
drafted the information charging offenses against Gambucci 
only and of the judge who stated that he was imposing sen-
4Penal Code section 956: "When an offense involves the commission 
of, or an attempt to commit a private injury, and is described ·1rlth 
sufficient certainty in other respects to identity the act, Ipl erroneous 
allegation as to the person injured, or intended to be injured, or of·. the 
place where the offense was committed, or of the propert,- involved in its 
commission, is not material." 
IAfter the jury returned their verdicts, counsel for Hill and petitioner 
Henry ·stated that those defendants wished to waive time for probation 
report and receive sentence at once. The following colloquy tqok place: 
"THE COURT: •.• [T]here is the matter of making the sentences run 
concurrently or consecutively. Normally we make them run concur-
rently •.. when they are convicted of separate offenses at one trial, and 
these all arose out of one series of acts-
, 'MR. LEVY [Deputy District Attorney]: One transaction. 
"THE COURT: - unless there's some cogent reason to the contrary, 
the Court would make the sentences run concurrently. Now, it you feel 
there is any such reason an investigation should be made as to any prior 
matters that would be material in that regard, I will refer it [for proba-
tion report. The judge pointed out that he had no control over the 
minimum punishments prescribed by law for the defendants who had 
suffered a prior conviction and were found to have been armed with a 
deadly weapon at the time of the attempted robbery.] ••• All I can do 
is make the judgments on the offenses with which they are charged i" thill 
Intormatioft. run consecutively or concurrently. 
"MR. LEVY: I think the Court bas indicated its desire that they run 
concurrently because it was jU8t the one act and it W(J8 jU8t t'M one 
armed or attempted armed robbery and the assault i8 aU a part 01 the 
one aot. 
"THE COURT: Well, I mean it was all one thing. They went in to rob 
the place and one of them, for one reason or another, pulled a gun and 
shot somebody. The jury having found they were acting together, they 
are all chargeable with responsibility for that .•.• But it you feel there 
is some reason why the Court should consider making them run consecu-
tively, of course I would refer it and listen to you on it .... 
, I MR. LEVY: ••• I think that the Court is correct and fair and just, 
and we will concur or stipulate that the Court sentence at this time, and 
that the Sfntences be concurrent ...• " (Italics added.) 
.. , ....... . 
tences for the offenses charged in that information, we cannot 
now uphold the two sentences on the entirely different theory 
that the omission from the information of an allegation that 
defendants attempted to rob Moe was a mere mistake in plead-
ing. (See People v. Foster (1926) 198 Cal. 112, 122 [243 P. 
667] ; People v. Hedderly (1954) 43 Ca1.2d 476, 480 [274 P.2d 
857].) 
The sentence for .assault with a deadly weapon is set asi4e 
and the Adult Authority is directed to exclude that purported 
sentence from its consideration in fixing petitioner's term. 
Petitioner is not entitled to release at this time, ho;wever, for 
he is held under the valid jUdgment of conviction of:attempted 
armed robbery. The order to show cause is discharged and the 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and 
Burke, J., concurred. 
